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et al.: Insurance Law

INSURANCE LAW
I. A SIGNED INSURANCE LOAN RECEIPT DOES NOT BAR A FIRST-PARTY
CLAIM

In Ketterman v. South CarolinaFarm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co." the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that an insured's signature on a loan receipt does not preclude the insured from seeking firstparty benefits under the insurance contract if the loan receipt does not
contain any language that prevents the insured from pursuing a claim
against the insurer and the insured has not negotiated the draft or
signed a release.
The loan receipt is a device whereby the insurer advances to the
insured the full amount of a loss in the form of a loan that is repayable
only to the extent of the insured's recovery from a responsible third
party. The insurer retains the option to pursue potentially responsible
parties and to exercise exclusive control over any such action.2 Conversely, full payment to the insured ordinarily subrogates the insurer
under equitable principles.3 By using the loan receipt arrangement, the
insured remains the real party in interest and
the insurer may prose4
cute the action in the name of the insured.
Most cases involving loan receipts concern either the responsible
party's attempt to raise the insurer's payment as a bar to an action
prosecuted by the insurer in the insured's name or the effect of a settlement between the insured and tortfeasor without the knowledge or
consent of the insurer. In contrast, Ketterman presented a very un-

1. 395 S.E.2d 187 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
2. See 44 AM. Jun. 2D Insurance § 1819 (1982).
3. E.g., Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Vic Bailey Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 S.C. 282, 284,
379 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1989) (per curiam).
4. Ketterman, 395 S.E.2d at 188-89; see, e.g., Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar
Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139, 145-49 (1918); Martin v. McCleod, 241 S.C. 71, 73-75, 127 S.E.2d
129, 130-31 (1962); see also Annotation, Insurance: Validity and Effect of Loan Receipt
or Agreement between Insured and Insurerfor a Loan Repayable to Extent of Insured's
Recovery from Another, 13 A.L.R.3D 42 (1967). But see Note, The Real Party Under
Rule 17(a): The Loan Receipt and Insurers' Subrogation Revisited, 74 MnNN. L. REv.
1107 (1990) (collecting federal cases dealing with Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and arguing superiority of minority rule requiring insurers to bring actions in
their own names); Boynton, The Myth of the "Loan Receipt" Revisited Under Rule
17(a), 18 S.C.L. REV. 624 (1966) (arguing purpose of Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure necessitates piercing loan receipt arrangements under certain
circumstances).
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usual situation: an insured's claim for benefits under the policy after
the insured signed a loan receipt.
In Ketterman the South Carolina Farm Bureau (the Farm Bureau) insured a chicken house owned by the Kettermans. The roof of
the chicken house collapsed following a snowfall. The Farm Bureau investigated the claim and tendered a draft to Mr. Ketterman. The reverse side of the draft contained a release agreement. Mr. Ketterman
never signed the release or negotiated the draft. However, Mr. Ketterman did sign a loan receipt. The court of appeals noted that the
loan receipt "contaln[ed] the standard language necessary to effectuate
its purpose. '" 5 Specifically, the loan receipt stated that the amount of
the draft was a loan repayable only to the extent of recovery from any
third person liable for the loss. Further, the agreement authorized the
Farm Bureau to control any claim Mr. Ketterman might have against
potentially liable third parties.
When the parties failed to agree on the amount of damage to the
chicken house, the Kettermans brought suit against the Farm Bureau
for breach of an insurance contract and bad faith refusal to pay firstparty benefits under an insurance contract. At trial the Farm Bureau
argued that the loan receipt barred any recovery by the Kettermans.
The trial judge rejected the argument and granted the Kettermans'
motion to strike the defense. The jury returned a verdict against the
Farm Bureau for actual and punitive damages. The Farm Bureau
appealed.0
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
Ketterman court focused on the words of the agreement. The court
noted that the loan receipt did not contain any language that precluded Mr. Ketterman from pursuing a claim against the Farm Bureau.7 The court also noted that the loan receipt did not contain language releasing the Farm Bureau from any potential claim for
additional benefits under the insurance contract.8 The court held that
these omissions, coupled with Mr. Ketterman's decision not to negotiate the draft or sign the release, rendered the Farm Bureau amenable
to suit by Mr. Ketterman on the insurance contract.9
Decisions from other jurisdictions involving loan receipts sometimes state in dicta that when the insurer fails to establish the liability
of another party or elects not to pursue a responsible party, the loan is

5. Ketterman, 395 S.E.2d at 189.
6. Id. at 188.
7. Id. at 189.
8. Id. Interestingly, the Farm Bureau adjuster handling the Kettermans' case testi-

fied that he did not consider the loan receipt a release. Id.
9. Id.
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transformed into an absolute payment. 10 The Ketterman opinion properly avoided giving broad effect to this dicta. Upon closer inspection, it
is apparent that those cases merely intended to express the obvious
effect of a loan receipt transaction: absent recovery from a responsible
third party, the insured owes nothing towards the "loan." In a sense,
the "loan" becomes final. Partial payment does not, however, automatically release the insurer from a claim by the insured for additional
contractual benefits.
In Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co."' the United
States Supreme Court approved of the use of a loan receipt over the
contention "that to treat it as if it were a loan, is to follow the letter of
the agreement and to disregard the actual facts; and to give it effect as
a loan is to sanction fiction and subterfuge. ' 12 The Court responded,
"But no good reason appears either for questioning its legality or for
denying it effect."' 3 Insurers that use loan receipts have relied on
Luckenbach and decisions from other jurisdictions that followed
4
Luckenbach.1
Although the Ketterman court found that the loan receipt did not
bar an action on the policy, courts should not read the opinion too
broadly. The court focused on the language of the loan receipt at issue
and attempted to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in
the written agreement. The court's fact-specific analysis does not preclude an insurance company from agreeing with its insured that a payment evidenced by a loan receipt constitutes a complete discharge of
the insurer's policy obligations. This result may be accomplished
through language in a loan receipt or in a separate writing. If clearly
and unambiguously expressed, courts should give effect to such an
agreement.
Timothy A. Domin

10. Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139, 148 (1918); L.W.&P.
Armstrong, Inc. v. The Mormacmar, 196 F.2d 752, 755 (2d Cir. 1952); Dejean v. Louisiana W.R.R., 167 La. 111, 118, 118 So. 822, 824 (1928); 44 AM. JuR. 2D Insurance § 1819
(1982).
11. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
12. Id. at 148.
13. Id.

14. The Luckenbach Court applied federal common law pursuant to Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The decision,
therefore, did not bind state courts. However, a majority of jurisdictions, including South
Carolina, chose to follow Luckenbach. Phillips v. Clifton. Mfg. Co., 204 S.C. 496, 501-02,
30 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1944); see Boynton, supra note 4, at 628-29.
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